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Abstract
We introduce a simple, geometric model of opinion polarization. It is a model of political
persuasion, as well as marketing and advertising, utilizing social values. It focuses on the
interplay between different topics and persuasion efforts. We demonstrate that societal opinion
polarization often arises as an unintended byproduct of influencers attempting to promote a
product or idea. We discuss a number of mechanisms for the emergence of polarization involving
one or more influencers, sending messages strategically, heuristically, or randomly. We also
examine some computational aspects of choosing the most effective means of influencing agents,
and the effects of those strategic considerations on polarization.
1 Introduction
Opinion polarization is a widely acknowledged social phenomenon, especially in the context of po-
litical opinions [FA08, SH15, IW15], leading to recent concerns over “echo chambers” created by
mass media [Pri13] and social networks [CRF+11, Par11, BMA15, BAB+18, Gar18]. The objec-
tive of this paper is to propose a simple, multi-dimensional geometric model of the dynamics of
polarization where the evolution of correlations between opinions on different topics plays a key
role.
Many models have been proposed to explain how polarization arises, and this remains an active
area of research [NSL90, Axe97, Noa98, HK02, MKFB03, BB07, DGL13, DVSC+17, KP18, PY18,
SCP+19]. Our attempt aims at simplicity over complexity. As opposed to a large majority of
previous works, our model does not require social network-based mechanism. Instead, we focus on
influences of advertising or political campaigns that reach a wide segment of the population.
We develop a high-dimensional variant of biased assimilation [LRL79] and use it as our main
behavioral assumption. The bias assimilation for one topic states that people tend to be receptive
to opinions they agree with, and antagonistic to opinions they disagree with.
The multi-dimensional setting reflects the fact that campaigns often touch on many topics.
For example, in the context of American politics, one might wonder why there exists a significant
correlation between opinions of individuals on, say, abortion access, gun rights and urgency of
climate change [Pew14]. Our model attempts to illustrate how such correlations between opinions
can arise as a (possibly unintended) effect of advertising exploiting different topics and social values.
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In mathematical terms, we consider a population of agents with preexisting opinions represented
by vectors in Rd, normalized such that the Euclidean length of each vector is 1. Each coordinate
represents a distinct topic, and the value of the coordinate reflects the agent’s opinion on the topic,
which can be positive or negative. We then consider a sequence of interventions affecting the
opinions. An intervention is also a unit vector in Rd, representing the set of opinions expressed
in, e.g., an advertising campaign or “news cycle”. Therefore, all opinions and interventions in our
model lie on the unit sphere in Rd.
We model the effect of intervention v on an agent’s opinion u in the following way. Supposing
an agent starts with opinion u ∈ Rd, after receiving an intervention v they will update the opinion
to the unit vector proportional to
w = u+ η · 〈u, v〉 · v , (1)
where η > 0 is a global parameter that controls the influence of an intervention. Most of our results
do not depend on a choice of η and in our examples we often take η = 1 for the sake of simplicity.
Smaller values of η could model campaigns with limited persuasive power.
Intuitively, the agent evaluates the received message in context of their existing opinion, and
assimilates this message weighted by their “agreement” with it. Our model exhibits biased assim-
ilation in that if the intervening opinion v is positively correlated with an agent’s opinion u, then
after the update the agent opinion moves towards v, and conversely, if v is negatively correlated
with u, then the update moves u away from v and towards the opposite opinion −v.
One way to think of the intervention is as an exposure to persuasion by a political actor, like a
political campaign message. A different way, in the context of marketing, is a product advertisement
that exploits values besides the quality of the product. In that context, we can think of one of the
d coordinates of the opinion vector as representing one’s opinion on a product being introduced
into the market and the remaining coordinates as representing preexisting opinions on other (e.g.,
social or political) issues. Then, an intervention would be an advertising effort to connect the
product with a certain set of opinions or values [VSL77]. Some examples are corporate advertising
campaigns supporting LGBT rights [Sny15] or gun manufacturers associating their products with
patriotism and conservative values [SVS04]. Another scenario of an intervention is a company (e.g.,
a bank or an airline [For18]) announcing its refusal to do business with the gun advocacy group
NRA. Such advertising strategies can have a double effect of convincing potential customers who
share relevant values and antagonizing those who do not.
Our main results show that such interventions, even if intending mainly to increase sales and
without direct intention to polarize, can have a side effect of increasing the extent of polarization
in the society. For example, it might be that, in a population with initial opinions distributed
uniformly, a number of interventions introduces some weak correlations. In our model, these corre-
lations can be profitably exploited by advertisers in subsequent interventions. As a side effect, the
interventions strengthen the correlations and increase polarization.
For example, suppose that after various advertising campaigns, we observe that people who tend
to like item A (say, electric cars) tend to be liberal, and people who like a seemingly unrelated item
B (say, firearms) tend to be conservative. This may result from the advertisers exploiting some
obvious connections, e.g., between electric cars and responding to climate change, and between
firearms and respect for the military. Subsequently, future advertising efforts for electric cars may
feature other values associated with liberals in America to appeal to potential consumers: an
advertisement might show a gay couple driving to their wedding in an electric car. Similarly, future
advertisements for firearms may appeal to conservative values for similar reasons. The end result
can be that the whole society becomes more polarized by the incorporation of political topics into
advertisements.
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Throughout the paper, we analyze properties of our model in a couple of scenarios. With respect
to the interventions, we consider two scenarios: either there is one entity (an influencer) trying
to persuade agents to adopt their opinion or there are two competing influencers pushing different
agendas. With respect to the time scale of intervations, we also consider two cases: the influencer(s)
can apply arbitrarily many interventions, i.e., the asymptotic setting, or they need to maximize
influence with a limited number of interventions, i.e., the short-term setting. The questions asked
are: (i) What sequence of interventions should be applied to achieve the influencer’s objective? (ii)
What are the computational resources needed to compute this optimal sequence? (iii) What are
the effects of applying the interventions on the population’s opinion structure? We give partial
answers to those questions. The gist of them is that in most cases, applying desired interventions
increases the polarization of agents.
1.1 Model definition
The formal definition of our model is simple. We consider a group of n agents, whose opinions are
represented by d-dimensional unit vectors, where each coordinate corresponds to a topic. We will
look into how those opinions change after receiving a sequence of interventions. Each intervention
is also a unit vector in Rd, representing the opinion contained in a message that the influencer (e.g.,
an advertiser) broadcast to the agents. Our model features one parameter: η > 0, signifying how
strongly an intervention influences the opinions.
After each intervention, the agents update their opinions by moving towards or away from the
intervention vector, depending on whether or not they agree with it (which is determined by the
inner product between the vector v and the opinion vector), and normalizing suitably. Suppose the
agents’ initial opinions are u1, . . . , un, ||ui|| = 1, and an intervention v is applied, then the updated
opinions u′1, . . . , u′n are given by
u′i =
wi
‖wi‖ , where wi = ui + η〈ui, v〉 · v . (2)
We note that, by expanding out the definition of wi,
‖wi‖2 = 〈wi, wi〉 = 1 + (2η + η2)〈ui, v〉2 (3)
In particular, this implies that ‖wi‖ ≥ 1, and consequently that u′i is well-defined. The norm in (2)
and everywhere else throughout is the standard Euclidean norm. Note that applying v and −v to
an opinion u results in the same updated opinion u′.
1.2 Example
To illustrate our model, let us consider an empirical example with η = 1. Suppose an advertiser
is marketing a new product. The opinion of the population has four dimensions. The population
consists of 500 agents, each with initial opinions ui = (ui,1, ui,2, ui,3, 0) ∈ R4 subject to u2i,1+ u2i,2+
u2i,3 = 1. The opinion on the new product is represented by the fourth coordinate, which is initially
set to zero for all agents. These starting opinions are sampled independently at random from the
uniform distribution on the sphere. A typical arrangement of initial opinions is shown under t = 1
in Figure 1.
Suppose the advertiser chooses to repeatedly apply an intervention that couples the product
with the preexisting opinion on the first coordinate. More concretely, let the intervention vector be
v = (β, 0, 0, α) , where α =
3
4
, β =
√
1− α2 .
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In that case, an application of the intervention v to an opinion u = (u1, u2, u3, 0) results in 〈u, v〉 =
βu1 and
u′ =
w
‖w‖ , w =
(
(1 + β2)u1, u2, u3, βαu1
)
, ‖w‖2 = 1 + 3β2u21 .
Note that after applying the intervention the first and last coordinates have the same sign. In
subsequent time steps, the intervention v is applied again to the updated opinion u′ and so on.
The evolution of opinions over five consecutive applications of v in this process is illustrated in
Figure 1. The interventions increase the affinity for the product for some agents while antagonizing
others. Furthermore, they have a side effect of polarizing the agents’ opinions also on the first three
coordinates. A similar example is included in Appendix A.
1.3 Outline of our results
We analyze the strategy of influencers in several settings.
In an “asymptotic scenario”, the influencer wants to apply an infinite sequence of interven-
tions v(1), v(2), . . . , that maximizes how many out of the n agent opinions converge to the target
vector v. As is standard, we say that a sequence of vectors u(1), · · · , u(t), . . . converges to a vector v
if limt→∞ ||u(t)−v|| = 0. One way to interpret this scenario is that a campaigner wants to establish
a solid base of support for their party platform.
In a “multiple-influencer scenario”, two influencers (such as two companies or two parties)
who have different objectives apply their two respective interventions on the population in a certain
order. We ask how the opinions change under such competing influences. This scenario can be
interpreted as two parties campaigning their agendas to the population.
In a “short-term scenario”, the influencer is advancing a product/subject which is expressed
in the last coordinate of opinion vectors ui,d. The influencer assumes some fixed threshold 0 < T < 1
and an upper bound K on the number of interventions, and asks, given n opinions u1, . . . , un, how
to choose v(1), · · · , v(K) in order to maximize the number of time-K opinions u(K)1 , . . . , u(K)n with
u
(K)
i,d > T . One interpretation is that advertisers only have a limited number of opportunities to
publicize their products to consumers, and consumers with u(K)i > T will decide to buy the product
after the interventions v(1), · · · , v(K) are applied.
We briefly summarize our results for these scenarios. In Section 3 we start by showing that
random interventions lead to a strong form of polarization. More precisely, assuming d = 2 and
uniformly distributed initial opinions, we prove that applying an independent random intervention
at each time step leads the opinions to form two equally-sized clusters converging to a pair of
(moving) antipodal points.
In Section 4 we consider the asymptotic scenario, where there is one influencer with a desired
campaign agenda v and unlimited numbers of interventions at its disposal. We ask which sequence
of interventions maximizes the number of opinions that converge to the agenda v. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, we show that such optimal strategy does not necessarily promote the campaign agenda
directly at every step. Instead, it finds a hemisphere containing the largest number of initial opin-
ions, concentrates the opinions in this hemisphere around an arbitrary point, and only in the last
stage nudges them gradually towards the target agenda. We then show that it is computationally
hard to approximate this densest hemisphere (and therefore the optimal strategy) to any additive
factor. Again, strong polarization emerges from our dynamic: there exists a pair of antipodal points
such that all opinions converge to one of them.
In Section 5 we study the short-term scenario where one influencer is allowed only one interven-
tion. In Section 5.1, we describe a case study with one influencer and two agents in the population.
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t = 3 t = 4
t = 5 t = 6
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the example discussed in Section 1.2. Since we are working in
d = 4, we illustrate the first three dimensions as spatial positions and the fourth dimension with a
color scale. Initially the opinions are uniformly distributed on the sphere, with the fourth dimension
equal to 0 (no opinion) everywhere. Consecutive applications of the message v = (
√
7/4, 0, 0, 3/4)
in R4 result in polarization both in spatial dimensions and in the color scale.
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We assume that the influencer wants to increase the correlations of agent opinions with the target
opinion v above a given threshold T > 0. We show consequences of optimal interventions depending
on if the influencer can achieve this objective for one or both agents. In Section 5.2, we consider
a similar scenario, but with a large number of agents. In that case, it surprisingly turns out that
the problem of finding optimal intervention in this short-term setting is related to the problem
analyzed in the asymptotic setting. The optimal campaign is equivalent to finding a spherical cap
containing the largest number of initial opinions.
In Section 6, we study two competing influencers. At each time step, one of the influencers is
selected at random to apply their intervention. One might hope that having multiple advertisers
can make the resulting opinions more spread-out, but we prove that this not the case. We show
that, as time goes to infinity, all opinions converge to the convex cone between the two campaign
agendas. Furthermore, we show that the if the correlation between the campaign agendas is high
enough, the strong form of polarization emerges: the opinions of the population concentrate around
two antipodes moving around in the convex cones of the two agendas.
1.4 Design choices
Our goal in this work is to provide a simple, elegant and analyzable model demonstrating how
correlations between different topics and natural interventions lead to polarization. That being the
case, there are many societal mechanisms related to polarization that we do not discuss here.
First, in contrast to majority of existing literature, we present a mechanism independent from
opinion changes induced by interactions between individuals. Second, we do not address aspects
such as replacement of the population or unequal exposure and effects of the interventions. We do
not consider any external influences on the population in addition to the interventions. Our model
does not align with (limited) theoretical and empirical research suggesting that in certain settings
exposure to conflicting views can decrease polarization [PT06, MS10, GMGM17, GGPT17] or work
that questions the overall extent of polarization in the society [FAP05, BG08].
We sometimes discuss the uniform distribution of initial opinions on Rd. We do this as the
uniform distribution may be viewed as the most diverse and establishing polarization starting from
the uniform distribution hints that we are modelic a generic phenomenon. Most of our result do
not make assumptions about the initial distribution.
We assume that any group of topics can be combined into an intervention with the effect
given by (1). A more plausible model might feature some “internal” (content) correlations between
topics in addition to “external” (social) correlations arising out of the agents’ opinion structure. For
example, topics may have innate connections, causing inherent correlations between corresponding
opinions (e.g., being positive on renewable energy and recycling). Furthermore, there are certain
topics (e.g., undesirability of murder) on which nearly all members of the population share the same
inclination. As a matter of fact, it is common for marketing strategies to exploit unobjectionable
social values (see, e.g., [VSL77]). However, we presume that under suitable circumstances (e.g., due
to inherent correlations we just mentioned) the “polarizing” topics might present a more appealing
alternative for a campaign. Our model concerns such a case, where the “unifying” topics might
be excluded from the analysis. We note that other works have also suggested that focusing on
polarizing topics may be appealing for campaigns [PY18].
Below we discuss a couple of specific design choices in more detail:
Euclidean unit ball We make an assumption that all opinions and interventions lie on the
Euclidean unit ball. Note that the interpretation of this representation is somewhat ambiguous.
The magnitude of an opinion on a given subject ui,k might signify the strength of the opinion, the
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confidence of the agent or relative importance of the subject to the agent. While these are different
measures, there are psychological reasons to expect that, e.g., “issue interest” and “extremity of
opinion” are correlated [LBS00, Bal07, BB07].
Especially taking the magnitudes as signifying the relative importance, we believe that the
assumption that this “budget of importance” for any given agent is fixed is quite natural. Of
course, choices of other norms are also possible. We leave studying variants of our model under
different norms to future work.
We note that rather than having all norms fixed to 1, we may consider an alternative where we
specify fixed, but different norms zi for different agents and modify the rule (2) so that we have
‖ui‖ = zi throughout the protocol. For example, the update can be proportional to
wi = ui + η ·
〈
ui
zi
, v
〉
· v
and normalized to preserve ‖u′i‖ = zi. As long as the values of zi are bounded from below and
above, the resulting dynamic is essentially identical and our results carry over to this more general
setup.
Another possibility is to consider unit vectors u ∈ Rd+1 with ud+1 ≥ 0 and interpret the first
d coordinates as opinions and the last coordinate as “unused budget”. Therefore, large values of
ud+1 signify generally uncertain opinions and small values of ud+1 correspond to strong opinions.
In order to apply an intervention v ∈ Rd+1, as before we compute c = 〈u, v〉 and set
u′ ∝ u+ cv∗ ,
where u′ is normalized to be a unit vector in d+ 1 dimensions, v∗ = v if c ≥ 0 and v∗ is v with the
sign of the last coordinate flipped if c < 0.
In this dynamics the value of the last coordinate ud+1 always moves towards vd+1. In other
words, applying a strong intervention (small vd+1) makes an opinion stronger and vice versa, re-
gardless of the sign of c. While we do not study this variant in this work, we point out that,
empirically, it seems to exhibit a threshold behavior. In general, applying strong interventions
leads to polarization of opinions into two clusters, while applying weak interventions leads to con-
sensus.
Effects of applying v and −v In our model, an effect of an intervention v is exactly the same
as for the opposite intervention −v. This might look like a cynical assumption about human
nature, but arguably it is not entirely inaccurate. For example, experiments on social media show
that not only exposure to similar ideas (the “echo chamber” effect), but also exposure to opposing
opinions causes beliefs to become more polarized [BAB+18]. This is even more apparent if a broader
notion of an intervention is considered. Using a recent example, social media platforms banning or
disassociating from certain statements can have a polarizing effect [BBC20]. Furthermore, in our
model this effect occurs only if all the components of an opinion are negated.
A related, more general objection is that direct persuasion is not possible in our model. If an
agent has an opinion with 〈u, v〉 < 0, directly applying v only makes the situation worse. Instead,
an effective influencer needs to apply interventions utilizing different subjects to gradually move u
through a sequence of intermediate positions towards v. Our answer is that we posit that a lot of,
if not all, persuasion actually works that way: to convince that “x is good”, one argues that “x is
good, since it is quite like y, which we both already agree is good”.
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Notions of polarization While the notion of polarization is clear when discussing one topic, it
is not straightforward to interpret in higher dimensions. For example, a natural definition of the
polarization of a set of agents U on a single topic i, is
ρi(S) =
1
|S|2 maxU⊂S
∑
x∈U,y∈S\U
(xi − yi)2,
and we may generalize it to higher dimensions by measuring the polarization as:
ρ(S) =
1
|S|2 maxU⊂S
∑
x∈U,y∈S\U
‖x− y‖2.
It is clear from the definition that
max
i
ρi(S) ≤ ρ(S) ≤
∑
i
ρi(S).
If we consider the set S1 with N/2 opinions at v and N/2 opinions at −v then clearly ρ(S1) =∑
i ρi(S1), but in any other example, the upper bound will not be tight. For example if S2 is the set
of the 2d vertices of a hypercube, i.e., S2 = 1/
√
d · {−1, 1}d, then ρi(S2) = 1/d for all i, but ρ(S2)
will be 1/2 + od(1). This corresponds to the fact that while the society is completely polarized on
each topic, two random individuals will agree on about half of the topics. In Section 2 we refer to
such a situation as exhibiting issue radicalization, but no issue alignment.
1.5 Other variants
Other than discussed above, there are many possible variants that can lead to interesting future
work. These include:
• “Targeting”, where the influencer can select subgroups of the population and apply interven-
tions groupwise.
• Perturbing preferences with noise after each step.
• Replacement of the population, e.g., introducing new agents with “fresh” opinions or removing
agents that stayed in the population for a long time or who already “bought” the product, i.e.,
exceeded the threshold ui,d > T . For example, this could correspond to ”one-time” purchase
product like a house or a fridge, or situations where the customer’s opinion is more difficult
to change as time passes.
• Models where the initial opinions are not observable or partially observable.
• Expanding the model by adding peer effects and social network structure and exploring the
resulting dynamics of polarization and opinion formation. We conjecture that most results
regarding polarization will be similar, at least when the opinion structure already shows some
moderate polarization, with peer interactions only speeding up the process.
• Strategic competing influencers: in the studied scenarios with competing influencers, we
assume that they apply fixed interventions. One can ask: suppose the influencers have their
own target opinions, what is each campaigner’s optimal sequence of messages in face of the
other campaigner? Then, resulting equilibrium of opinion formation could be analyzed. This
can be modeled as a dynamic game where the game state is the opinion configuration and
optimal strategies may be derived using sequential planning and control.
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2 Related works
As mentioned, there is a multitude of modeling and empirical works studying opinion polarization in
different contexts [NSL90, Axe97, BG98, Noa98, HK02, MKFB03, MS05, BB07, DGL13, DVSC+17,
KP18, SCP+19, PY18, BAB+18]. Broadly speaking, previous works have proposed various possible
sources for polarization, including peer interactions, bias in individuals’ perceptions, and global
information outlets.
There is an extensive line of models of opinion exchange on networks with peer interactions,
where individuals encounter neighboring individuals’ opinions and update their own opinions based
on, e.g., pre-defined friend/hostile relations [SPJ+16], or the similarity and relative strength of
opinions [MS10], etc. This branch of work often attributes polarization to homophily of one’s social
network [DGL13] that is induced by the self-selective nature of social relations and segregation of
like-minded people [WMKL15] and exacerbated by the echo chamber effect of social media [Par11].
A parallel proposed mechanism are psychological biases in individuals’ opinion formation pro-
cesses. One example is biased assimilation [LRL79, DGL13, BB07, BAB+18]: the tendency to
reinforce one’s original opinions regardless if other encountered opinions align with them or not.
For example, [BAB+18] observed that even when social media users are assigned to follow accounts
that share opposing opinions, they still tend to hold their old political opinions and often to a more
extreme degree. On the modeling side, [DGL13] showed that DeGroot opinion dynamics with the
biased assimilation property on a homophilous network may lead to polarization.
Existing works have also proposed models where polarization occurs even when information is
shared globally [Zal92, MS05]. For example, [MS05] propose a model where competition for read-
ership between global information outlets causes news to become polarized in a single-dimensional
setting. Another example is [Zal92], a classical work on the formation of mass opinion. It theo-
rizes that each individual has political dispositions formed in their own life experience, education
and previous encounters that intermediate between the message they encounter and the political
statement they make. Therefore, hearing the same political message can cause different thinking
processes and changes in political preferences in different individuals.
It is noteworthy that the majority of previous work focuses on polarization on a single topic
dimension. Two exceptions are [BB07], which studies biased assimilation with opinions on multi-
ple topics and [BG08] that observed non-trivial correlation between people’s attitudes on different
issues. We note that [BB07] uses a different updating rule to observe dynamics that differ from our
work: in their simulations, polarization on one issue typically does not result in polarization on oth-
ers. There is also a class of models [Axe97, Noa98, MKFB03] that concern multi-dimensional opin-
ions where an opinion on a given topic takes one of finitely many values (e.g., + or −). These models
do not seem to have a geometric structure of opinion space similar to ours and usually focus on
formation of discrete groups in the society rather than total polarization. Another model [PPTF17]
uses a geometric (affine) rule of updating multi-dimensional opinions. Unlike us, they seem to be
modeling pre-existing, “intrinsic” correlations between topics rather than the emergence of new
ones and they are concerned mostly with convergence and stability of their dynamics.
A related paper [PY18] contains a geometric model of opinion (preference) structures. Both
this and our model propose mechanisms through which information outlets acting for their own
benefit can lead to increased disagreement in the society. The key difference to our model is that
their population’s preferences are static and do not update, but the outlets are free to choose
what information to offer to their customers. By contrast, in our model, the influencers have
pre-determined ideologies and compete to align agents’ opinions with their own. In other words,
[PY18] focuses on modeling of competitive information acquisition, and our paper on modeling the
influence of marketing on the public opinion.
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Our model suggests that under the conditions of biased assimilation, opinion manipulation by
one or several global information outlets can unintentionally lead to a strong form of polarization
in multi-dimensional opinion space. Not only do people polarize on individual issues, but also their
opinions on previously unrelated issues become correlated. This form of polarization is known
as issue alignment [BG08] in political science and sociology literature. Issue alignment refers to
an opinion structure where the population’s opinions on multiple (relatively independent) issues
correlate. It is related to issue radicalization, where the opinions polarize for each issue separately.
Compared to issue radicalization, issue alignment is theorized to pose more constraints on the
opinions an individual can take, resulting in polarized and clustered mass opinions even when
the public opinions are not extreme in any single topic, and presenting more obstacles for social
integration and political stability [BG08]. In light of this, one way to view our model is as a
mathematical mechanism by which this strong form of polarization can arise and worsen due to
companies’, politicians’, and the media’s natural attempts to gain support from the public.
On the more technical side, we note that our update equation bears similarity to Kuramoto
model [JMB04] for synchronization of oscillators on a network in the control literature. In this
model, each oscillator i is associated with the point θi on the two-dimensional sphere, and i updates
its point continuously as a function of its neighbors’ points θj :
θ˙i = ωi +
K
N
sin(θj − θi),
where K is the coupling strength and N is the number of nodes in the network. In two dimensions,
our model can be compared to Kuramoto model with ωi = 0 on a star graph, with the influencers
at the center of the star connected to the entire population, where the influencers’ opinions do not
change and the update strength is qualitatively similar to sin((θv − θu)/2) (see (22)). However,
we note a crucial difference: in the Kuramoto dynamic, θi always moves towards θj , i.e. nodes
always move towards synchronization, but in our dynamic, opinions θi are allowed to move further
away from θj when the angle between their opinions are obtuse. In addition, the central node in
our model can be strategic in choosing their positions, while the central node in Kuramoto model
follows the synchronization dynamics of the system. We think this property provides a better model
for opinion interactions.
3 Asymptotic scenario: random interventions polarize opinions
In this section, we analyze the long-term behavior of our model in a simple random setting. We as-
sume that, in dimension d = 2, at the initial time t = 1 we are given n opinion vectors u(1)1 , . . . , u
(1)
n .
Subsequently, we sample a sequence of interventions v(1), v(2), . . . , each v(t) i.i.d from the uniform
distribution on the unit circle S1. At time t we apply the random intervention v(t) to every opinion
vector u(t)i , obtaining a new opinion u
(t+1)
i .
We want to show that the opinions {u(t)i } almost surely polarize as time t goes to infinity. We
need to be careful about defining the notion of polarization: since the interventions change at every
time step, the opinions cannot converge to a fixed vector. Instead, we show that for every pair of
opinions the angle between them converges either to 0 or to pi. More formally:
Theorem 3.1. For any fixed opinions u(1)1 and u
(1)
2 and a sequence of uniform i.i.d. interventions,
we have
Pr
[
‖u(t)1 − u(t)2 ‖ → 0 ∨ ‖u(t)1 + u(t)2 ‖ → 0
]
= 1 .
10
This leads to the following corollary for any finite number of agents:
Corollary 3.2. For any fixed opinions u(1)1 , . . . , u
(1)
n and a sequence of uniform i.i.d. interventions,
almost surely, there exists S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that the diameter of the set{
(−1)1[i∈S] · u(t)i : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
converges to zero.
Remark 3.3. If initial opinions u1, . . . , un are independently sampled from a distribution that is
symmetric around the origin, then, with high probability, the opinions converge to two polarized
clusters of size roughly n/2. This is since initial opinions ui and uj converge to the same cluster
if and only if ui and −uj converge to the opposite clusters. Then we can apply the symmetry
assumption and standard concentration bounds.
Remark 3.4. For simplicity we do not elaborate on this later, but we note that, both empirically
and theoretically, the convergence in our results is quite fast. Indeed, we observe that it takes only
O(log 1/ε) interventions to bring a fixed opinion u to have 1 − ε correlation with a target opinion
v.
We now proceed to prove Theorem 3.1 using martingale convergence. We believe the theorem
holds also for d ≥ 3, but our proof does not apply to this case.
In the proof we consider a random variable αt ∈ [0, pi] representing the angle between u(t)1 and
u
(t)
2 and we show that it is a martingale. By the martingale convergence theorem, this means that
αt almost surely converges. Furthermore, since for 0 < ε < αt < pi − ε the conditional variance
Var[αt | αt−1] is bounded away from 0, the only possible convergence points are 0 and pi.
As for Corollary 3.2, it follows from Theorem 3.1 by applying the union bound (with probability
0 in each term) for each pair of opinions u(t)i , u
(t)
j .
3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
To start with, we develop some notation. Let f : S1×S1 → S1 be the function mapping an opinion
u and an intervention v to an updated opinion f(u, v), according to (2) and (3). Note that this
function is invariant under rotation: namely, for any real unitary transformation A : S1 → S1 we
have
f(Au,Av) = Af(u, v) . (4)
We will now state and prove two claims. In both of them we fix a time t and opinions u := u(t)1 ,
u′ := u(t)2 . We also let v := v
(t). As discussed, define
αt := arccos〈u, u′〉 ∈ [0, pi]
as the primary angle between u and u′.
Claim 3.5. E[αt+1 | αt] = αt.
Proof. It follows from (4) that we can assume wlog that u = (1, 0) and u′ = (cosαt, sinαt). Let us
write the random intervention vector as v = (cosβ, sinβ), where the distribution of β is uniform in
[0, 2pi). We will also write (cf. Figure 2 for an overview)
f(u, v) = (cos δ, sin δ) , f(u′, v) = (cos(αt + δ′), sin(αt + δ′)) , δ, δ′ ∈ [−pi, pi) .
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f(u′, v)u
′
u
f(u, v)
αt
β
δ′
δ
u′
v
v∗
uε
Figure 2: On the left an illustration of the vectors and angles in the proof of Claim 3.5. On the
right an illustration for the proof of Claim 3.7.
If 〈u, v〉 ≥ 0 (which is equivalent to αt ≤ pi/2), then f(u, v) is a convex combination of u
and v. Hence, in that case 0 ≤ δ ≤ pi/2. On the other hand, if 〈u, v〉 < 0, then we can use
f(u, v) = f(u,−v), apply the same argument to −v and get −pi/2 ≤ δ < 0. In any case, we have
−pi/2 < δ, δ′ < pi/2. Furthermore, since it is easy to check that δ(β) = −δ(2pi − β), we also have∫ 2pi
0
δ dβ = 0 , (5)
and, similarly, applying (4),
∫ 2pi
0 δ
′ dβ = 0.
Let α∗ := αt+ δ′− δ (mod 2pi), i.e., we take α∗ to be the directed angle from f(u, v) to f(u′, v)
reduced to lie in the interval [0, 2pi). A crucial observation is that
0 ≤ α∗ ≤ pi . (6)
This is a result of our choice of the coordinate system and the fact that applying an intervention
does not change the orientation of opinion vectors. Let us proceed further, assuming (6) and
deferring its proof until later.
Due to (6), we get
αt+1 = arccos〈f(u, v), f(u′, v)〉 = arccos(cos δ cos(αt + δ′) + sin δ sin(αt + δ′)) = arccos(cos(α∗)) = α∗ .
We can now start substituting
E[αt+1 | αt] = 1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
αt+1 dβ =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
α∗ dβ =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
[
αt + δ
′ − δ (mod 2pi)
]
dβ . (7)
We now argue that
αt + δ
′ − δ (mod 2pi) = αt + δ′ − δ , (8)
that is 0 ≤ αt + δ′ − δ < 2pi. Indeed, using 0 ≤ αt ≤ pi and −pi/2 < δ, δ′ < pi/2 we have
−pi < αt + δ′ − δ < 2pi ,
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but −pi < αt + δ′ − δ < 0 would imply α∗ > pi, contradicting (6). Finally, substituting (8) and (5)
into (7), we arrive at
E[αt+1 | αt] = αt + 1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
δ′ dβ − 1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
δ dβ = αt ,
concluding the proof.
It remains to deal with (6):
Fact 3.6. 0 ≤ α∗ ≤ pi.
Proof. Let us embed our underlying space R2 in R3 by setting the last coordinate to zero. Letting
× denote the cross product, we have
u× u′ = (0, 0, sinαt) , f(u, v)× f(u′, v) = (0, 0, sinα∗) .
Since the case αt ∈ {0, pi} is easily handled by noticing that α∗ = αt, we can assume that 0 < αt < pi.
In that case, it is enough that we prove〈
u× u′, f(u, v)× f(u′, v)〉 = sinαt sinα∗ ≥ 0 . (9)
Setting C(w) :=
√
1 + (2η + η2)〈w, v〉2, we apply (2) and bilinearity of cross product to compute
f(u, v)× f(u′, v) = 1
C(u)C(u′)
(
u× u′ + η(〈u, v〉(v × u′) + 〈u′, v〉(u× v)))
=
1
C(u)C(u′)
(
u× u′ + η(u× u′ + (〈u, v〉v − u)× (u′ − 〈u′, v〉v))) (10)
=
1 + η
C(u)C(u′)
· u× u′ , (11)
where in (10) we used the identity a× b+ c× d = a× d+ c× b+ (a− c)× (b− d), and in (11) we
used that both 〈u, v〉v− u and u′− 〈u′, v〉v are projections of vectors onto the line orthogonal to v,
and therefore they are parallel and their cross product vanishes.
Consequently, we conclude that f(u, v) × f(u′, v) is parallel to u × u′ with a positive propor-
tionality constant, which implies (9) and concludes the proof.
Claim 3.7. For every ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that,
ε ≤ αt ≤ pi/2 =⇒ Pr
[
αt+1 < αt − δ | αt
]
> δ , (12)
and, symmetrically,
pi/2 ≤ αt ≤ pi − ε =⇒ Pr
[
αt+1 > αt + δ | αt
]
> δ . (13)
Proof. Again we assume wlog that u = (1, 0) and u′ = (cosαt, sinαt). Note that our intervention
function f exhibits a symmetry f(−u, v) = −f(u, v). Furthermore, we also have arccos〈u, u′〉 =
pi − arccos〈u,−u′〉. Consequently,
αt+1 − αt = arccos〈f(u, v), f(u′, v)〉 − arccos〈u, u′〉
= pi − arccos〈f(u, v), f(−u′, v)〉 − (pi − arccos〈u,−u′〉)
= −( arccos〈f(u, v), f(−u′, v)〉 − arccos〈u,−u′〉) .
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As a result, it is enough that we prove (12) and then (13) follows by replacing u′ with −u′.
Consider vector v∗ := (cos ε, sin ε) (see Figure 2). We will now show that if ε ≤ αt ≤ pi/2 and
the intervention v is sufficiently close to v∗, then v decreases the angle between u and u′. To that
end, let us use a metric on S1 given by
D(u, v) := arccos〈u, v〉 .
Note that this metric is strongly equivalent to the standard Euclidean metric on S1. We can now
us triangle inequality to write
αt+1 = D(f(u, v), f(u
′, v))
≤ D(f(u, v), f(u, v∗)) +D(f(u, v∗), v∗) +D(v∗, f(u′, v∗)) +D(f(u′, v∗), f(u′, v)) . (14)
Let us now bound the terms in (14) one by one.
First, since, by (2), f(u, v∗) is a strict convex combination of u and v∗, we have
D(f(u, v∗), v∗) = d(ε) < D(u, v∗) = ε .
Similarly,
D(v∗, f(u′, v∗)) ≤ D(v∗, u′) = αt − ε .
Second, since f is continuous, if we assume that D(v, v∗) < δ for small enough δ > 0, then we can
make both D(f(u, v), f(u, v∗)) and D(f(u′, v∗), f(u′, v)) as small as needed (for example, less than
(ε− d(ε))/4).
All in all, we have that for some δ = δ(ε) > 0,
D(v, v∗) < δ =⇒ αt+1 < ε− d(ε)
4
+ d(ε) + (αt − ε) + ε− d(ε)
4
= αt − ε− d(ε)
2
.
However, clearly, Pr [D(v, v∗) < δ] = δ/2pi > 0. Therefore, taking δ′ := min
(
δ/4pi, (ε − d(ε))/2),
we have
Pr
[
αt+1 < αt − δ′ | αt
]
> δ′ ,
as claimed in (12).
As a consequence of applying Claim 3.7 dpi/δe times, we obtain that for every ε > 0 there exist
k ∈ N and η < 1 such that
ε ≤ αt ≤ pi − ε =⇒ Pr [ε ≤ αt+k ≤ pi − ε | αt] ≤ η .
Subsequently, it follows that for any fixed ε > 0 and T ∈ N,
Pr [∀t ≥ T : ε ≤ αT+t ≤ pi − ε] = 0 . (15)
To finish the proof of Theorem 3.1, we use standard tools from theory of martingales. By
Claim 3.5, the sequence of random variables αt is a bounded martingale and therefore almost
14
surely converges. Accordingly, let α∗ := limt→∞ αt. We now argue that Pr[0 < α∗ < pi] = 0. To
that end,
Pr[0 < α∗ < pi] ≤
∞∑
s=1
Pr
[
1
s
< α∗ < pi − 1
s
]
≤
∞∑
s=1
Pr
[
∃T : ∀t ≥ T : 1
2s
< αt < pi − 1
2s
]
≤
∞∑
s=1
∞∑
T=1
Pr
[
∀t ≥ T : 1
2s
< αt < pi − 1
2s
]
= 0 ,
where we applied (15) in the last line. Hence, almost surely, either α∗ = 0, which is equivalent to
‖u(t)1 − u(t)2 ‖ → 0 or α∗ = pi, equivalent to ‖u(t)1 + u(t)2 ‖ → 0.
4 Asymptotic scenario: finding densest hemishpere
In this section we study the asymptotic scenario with one influencer who wishes to propagate
a campaign agenda v∗ ∈ Rd. We assume that the influencer can use an unlimited number of
interventions and its objective is to make the opinions of as many agents as possible to converge
to v∗. More precisely, given the preexisting opinions of n agents, u1, . . . , un, we want to find a
sequence of interventions, v(1), v(2), v(3) . . . that maximizes the number of agents whose opinions
converge to v∗.
The thrust of our results is that finding a good strategy for the influencer is computationally
hard. However, both the optimal strategy and some natural heuristics result in the polarization of
agents.
4.1 Equivalence of optimal strategy with finding densest hemisphere
We first argue that the problem of finding an optimal strategy is equivalent to identifying an open
hemisphere that contains the maximum number of agents. An open hemishpere is an intersection
of the unit sphere with a homogeneous open halfspace of the form
{
u ∈ Rd : 〈u, v〉 > 0} for some
v ∈ Rd.
Theorem 4.1. For any v∗, there exists a strategy to make at least k agents converge to v∗ if and
only if there exists an open hemisphere containing at least k of the opinions u1, . . . , un.
A surprising aspect of Theorem 4.1 is that the maximum number of agents that can be persuaded
does not depend on the target vector v∗. As we argue in Remark 4.3, this is somewhat plausible
in the long-term setting with unlimited number of interventions. We also note that how many
interventions it takes to bring the opinions up to a given level of closeness to v∗ does depend on v∗.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. First, we prove that the hemisphere condition is sufficient for the existence of
a strategy to make the agents’ opinions converge (Claim 4.2). Then we prove the trickier direction:
that the hemisphere condition is also necessary for the existence of such a strategy (Claim 4.7).
Claim 4.2. If opinions u1, . . . , uk are contained in an open hemisphere, then there is a sequence
of interventions making all of u1, . . . , uk converge to v∗.
Proof. By definition of open hemisphere, there is a vector a ∈ Rd such that 〈a, ui〉 > 0 for every
agent i = 1, . . . , k. By (2), it is clear that repeated application of a makes all the points converge
to a as time t→∞ .
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After all the points are clustered close enough to a, by a similar argument they can be “moved
around” together towards another arbitrary point v∗. For example, if 〈v∗, a〉 > 0, the intervention
v∗ can be applied repeatedly. If 〈v∗, a〉 ≤ 0, one can proceed in two stages, first applying an
intervention proportional to (v∗ + a)/2, and then applying v∗.
Remark 4.3. As a possible interpretation of the mechanism in Claim 4.2, it is not unheard of
in campaigns on political issues to use an analogous strategy. First, build a consensus around a
(presumably compromise) opinion. Then, “nudge” it little by little towards another direction.
In an extreme case one can imagine this mechanism even flipping the opinions of two polarized
clusters. One example of this could be the reversal of the opinions on certain issues of 20th century
Republican and Democratic parties in the US (this particular phenomenon can be found in many
texts, e.g. [KW18]).
To prove the other direction of Theorem 4.1, we will rely on the notions of conical combination
and convex cone. A conical combination of points u1, . . . , un ∈ Rd is any point of the form
∑n
i=1 αiui
where αi ≥ 0 for every i. A convex cone is a subset of Rd that is closed under finite conical
combinations of its elements. Given a finite set of points S ⊆ Rd, the convex cone generated by S
is the smallest convex cone that contains S.
Claim 4.4. Suppose that for a given sequence of interventions, the opinions u1, . . . , un converge
to the same point v∗. Then, for any unit vector un+1 that lies in the convex cone of u1, . . . , un, we
have that un+1 also converges to v∗.
Proof. It suffices to prove that if un+1 lies in the convex cone of u1, . . . , un, then after applying one
intervention v the new opinion u′n+1 lies in the convex cone of u′1, . . . , u′n. Then the claim follows
by induction.
To prove this, we can simply write out u′n+1, using the relation un+1 =
∑n
i=1 λiui (where we
use the notation u ∝ v to mean that u = c · v for some constant c > 0):
u′n+1 ∝ un+1 + η 〈un+1, v〉 · v
=
n∑
i=1
λiui + η ·
n∑
i=1
λi 〈ui, v〉 · v
=
n∑
i=1
λi (ui + η · 〈ui, v〉 · v)
=
n∑
i=1
λi · ciu′i (16)
where the constants in (16) are ci := ‖ui + η · 〈ui, v〉 · v‖. Specifically, they are all nonnegative.
Claim 4.5. Suppose there are two opinions u1, u2 that are antipodal, i.e., u1 = −u2. Then these
two opinions will remain antipodal in future time steps. In particular, they will never converge to
a single point.
Proof. This follows directly from (2), noting that, for any intervention v, we have u1+η ·〈u1, v〉·v =
− (u2 + η · 〈u2, v〉 · v).
We will also use the following consequence of the separating hyperplane theorem:
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Fact 4.6. A collection of unit vectors a1, . . . , an cannot be placed in an open hemisphere if and
only if the zero vector lies in the convex hull of a1, . . . , an.
Now we are ready to establish the reverse implication in Theorem 4.1.
Claim 4.7. Suppose that we start with agent opinions u1, . . . , un and that there is no hemisphere
that contains M of those opinions. Then, there is no strategy that makes M of the opinions converge
to the same point.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that there exists a strategy that makes M opinions converge
to the same point, and assume wlog that they are u1, . . . , uM . By assumption, we know that there
is no hemisphere that contains all of u1, . . . , uM , hence, by Fact 4.6, there is a convex combination
of u1, . . . , uM that equals 0. Therefore, there is also a conical combination of u1, . . . , uM−1 that
equals −uM , where wlog we assume that the coefficient on uM is initially nonzero. By Claim 4.4,
we conclude that if u1, . . . , uM−1 converge to the same point, then so does −uM . But that means
that −uM and uM converge to the same point, which is a contradiction by Claim 4.5.
That concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Remark 4.8. One consequence of Theorem 4.1 is that if the agent opinions are initially distributed
uniformly on the unit sphere, an optimal strategy converging as many opinions as possible to v∗
results, with high probability, in dividing the population into two groups of roughly equal size, where
the opinions inside each group converge to one of two antipodal limit opinions (i.e., v∗ and −v∗).
Theorem 4.1 implies that an optimal strategy for the influencer is to compute the hemisphere
that is the densest, i.e., it contains the most opinions and then apply the procedure from Claim 4.2
to converge the opinions from this hemisphere to v∗.
The densest hemisphere problem turns out to be equivalent to the previously studied problem of
learning noisy halfspaces, allowing to apply known algorithmic and computational hardness results.
In particular, applying a work by Guruswami and Raghavendra [GR09] we show in Section 4.2
that it is computationally difficult to even approximate the densest hemisphere up to any constant
factor:
Theorem 4.9. Unless P=NP, for any ε > 0, there is no polynomial time algorithm that distin-
guishes between instances of densest hemisphere problem such that, letting D := {u1, . . . , un}:
• Either there exists a hemisphere H such that |D ∩H|/n > 1− ε.
• Or for every hemisphere H we have |D ∩H|/n < 1/2 + ε.
Consequently, unless P=NP, there is no polynomial time algorithm that, given an instance D that
has a hemisphere with density more than 1−ε, outputs a hemisphere with density more than 1/2+ε.
At the same time, [BDS00] (relying on earlier work [BDES02]) shows that there exists an
algorithm that finds a dense hemisphere provided that this hemisphere is stable in the sense that
it remains dense even after a small perturbation of its separating hyperplane:
Theorem 4.10 ([BDS00]). For every η > 0, there exists a polynomial time algorithm that, given
an instance D = {u1, . . . , un} of the densest hemisphere problem, provides the following guarantee:
If there exists a halfspace Hη = {x : 〈v, x〉 > η} such that |D ∩Hη|/n > α, then the algorithm
outputs a hemisphere corresponding to a homogeneous halfspace H = {x : 〈w, x〉 > 0} such that
|D ∩H|/n > α.
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In other words, if there exists a hemisphere that contains many opinions, and the opinions do
not lie close to the separating hyperplane, there is an efficient algorithm to find this hemisphere,
which can then be used to persuade the agents.
4.2 Computational equivalence to learning halfspaces
In this section we elaborate on how to obtain Theorem 4.9 from known results. To that end, we
start with defining the problem of finding a maximum agreement halfspace, studiend in the context
of learning halfspaces in perceptron problems.
Definition 4.11 (Maximum Agreement Halfspace). In the problem of maximum agreement halfs-
pace, given a labeled set of points D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} ∈ Rd × {±1}, the objective is to find
a halfspace H = {x : 〈v, x〉 > c} maximizing the agreement
A(D,H) =
∑n
i=1 1 [yi · xi ∈ H]
n
.
As pointed out in [BDS00], there exists a reduction from the maximum agreement halfspace
problem to the densest hemisphere problem that preserves the quality of solutions. Since this
reduction is only briefly sketched in [BDS00], we describe it below.
The reduction proceeds as follows: Given a labeled set D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} ∈ Rd×{±1},
we map it to D′ = {x′1, . . . , x′n} ∈ Rd+1 using the formula
x′i =
1√
1 + ‖xi‖2
· (yixi, 1) .
In other words, we proceed in three steps: first, we negate each point that came with negative label
yi = −1. Then, we add a new coordinate and set its value to 1 for every point xi. Finally, we
normalize each resulting point so that it lies on the unit sphere in Rd+1.
This is a so-called “strict reduction”, which is expressed in the following claim:
Claim 4.12. The solutions (halfspaces) for an instance of Maximum Agreement Halfspace D are in
one-to-one correspondence with solutions (hemispheres) for the reduced instance of Densest Hemi-
sphere D′. Furthermore, for a corresponding pair of solutions (H,H ′) the agreement A(D,H) is
equal to the density |D′ ∩H ′|/n.
Proof. It is more convenient to think of solutions for D′ as homogeneous, open halfspaces H ′ =
{x ∈ Rd+1 : 〈v, x〉 > 0}.
With that in mind, we map a solution to the maximum agreement halfspace problem H =
{x ∈ Rd : 〈v, x〉 > c} to a solution to the densest hemisphere problem H ′ = {(x, xd+1) ∈ Rd+1 :
〈(v,−c), (x, xd+1)〉 > 0}. Clearly, this is a one-to-one mapping between open halfspaces in Rd and
homogeneous open halfspaces in Rd+1.
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that yi ·xi ∈ H if and only if x′i ∈ H ′ and therefore A(D,H) =
|D′ ∩H ′|/n.
The reduction allows us to use a strong hardness of approximation result from [GR09] (see also
[FGKP06, BB06, BDEL03, AK98] for related work):
Theorem 4.13 ([GR09]). Unless P=NP, for any ε > 0, there is no polynomial time algorithm that
distinguishes the following, given an instance of maximum agreement halfspace problem:
• There exists a halfspace H such that A(D,H) > 1− ε.
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• For every halfspace H we have A(D,H) < 1/2 + ε.
In other words, it is computationally hard to distinguish between instances that have halfspaces
with almost perfect agreement and instances where there is no halfspace with agreement noticeably
larger than 1/2 (of course for a random hyperplane, almost surely one of the two halfspaces defined
by this hyperplane has an agreement at least 1/2). Consequently, unless P=NP, there is no poly-
nomial time algorithm that, for any ε > 0, given an instance that has a halfspace with agreement
1−ε, finds a halfspace with agreement more than 1/2+ε. We note that the results in [GR09] show
hardness for instances with dimension d comparable to the number of points n.
Finally, by standard (and straightforward) arguments from complexity theory, Theorem 4.9
follows from Theorem 4.13 and Claim 4.12.
5 Short-term scenario: polarization as externality
The analysis of the asymptotic setting with unlimited interventions tells us what is feasible and
what is not. A fundamentally different question is how to persuade as many as possible with
limited number of interventions. This is motivated by bounded resources or time that usually allow
only limited placements of campaigns and advertisements. Furthermore, arguably only the initial
interventions can be considered effective: in the long run the opinions might shift due to external
factors and become more unpredictable and harder to control. Therefore, in this section we discuss
strategies where the influencer has only one intervention at its disposal, and its goal is to get as
many agents as possible to exceed certain “threshold of agreement” with its preferred opinion.
Throughout this section, we fix η = 1 in Equation 1, so an opinion u is updated to be proportional
to w = u+ 〈u, v〉 · v.
Both scenarios we discuss in this section describe a situation where a “new” product or idea
is introduced. Therefore, we assume that the agents have some preexisting opinions in Rd−1 and
that they are neutral as to the new idea, with the d-th coordinate set to zero for every agent. Our
results indicate significant potential for polarization in such a situation. This is in spite of the fact
that the influencer might only care about persuading a number of agents towards the new subject,
without intention to polarize.
5.1 One intervention, two agents: polarization costs
We consider a simple example that features only two agents and one influencer who is allowed one
intervention. We imagine a new product, such that the agents are initially agnostic about it, i.e.,
ui,d = 0 for i = 1, 2. Given an intervention v, we are interested in two issues: First, what will
be new opinions of agents about the product u′i,d? Second, assuming that the initial correlation
between opinions is c = 〈u1, u2〉, what will be the new correlation c′ = 〈u′1, u′2〉? We think of the
correlation as a measure of agreement between the agents and therefore interpret differences in
correlation as changes in the extent of polarization.
To this end, we introduce notions of two- and one-agent interventions corresponding to two
natural strategies:
Definition 5.1. The two-agent intervention is an intervention that maximizes min(u′1,d, u
′
2,d). The
one-agent intervention maximizes max(u′1,d, u
′
2,d).
The motivation for this definition is as follows. Assume that there exists a threshold T > 0
such that agent i is going to make a positive decision (e.g., buy the product or vote a certain way)
if its coordinate u′i,d exceeds T . Then, if the influencer cares only about inducing agents to make
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the decision, it has two natural choices for the intervention. One option is the case where it is
possible to induce two decisions, i.e., achieve u′1,d, u
′
2,d > T . By continuity considerations, it is not
difficult to see that an intervention that achieves this can be assumed to maximize min(u′1,d, u
′
2,d)
with u′1,d = u
′
2,d (such intervention is also optimal if the influencer bets on convincing both agents
without knowing T ). The other case is to appeal only to one of the agents, disregarding the second
agent and concentrating only on achieving, say, u′1,d > T .
Let c = 〈u1, u2〉 be the initial correlation between opinions and let c(2) and c(1) be the correlations
after applying, respectively, the two- and one-agent interventions. Our main result in this section
is:
Proposition 5.2. Let ρ := c(2)−c(1) be a value that we call the polarization cost. Then, we always
have ρ ≥ 0 with exact values given as
c(2) = 1−
√
2(1− c)√
3c+ 5
, c(1) =
c
√
2√
c2 + 1
. (17)
The values of ρ, c(2) and c(1) as functions of c are illustrated in Figure 3. Proposition 5.2 states
that the one-agent intervention always results in smaller correlation than the two-agent intervention.
Note that we made a modeling assumption that the influencer will always choose an intervention
as opposed to doing nothing. This is consistent with a scenario where the influencer’s objective is
to increase the opinions above the threshold T . In that case doing nothing is certain to give no
gain to the influencer.
The main conclusion of this theorem is consistent with our other results. In the setting we
consider, in the absence of any external mitigation, the self-interested influencer without direct
intention to polarize might be incentivized to choose the intervention that increases polarization.
If polarization is regarded as undesirable, the polarization cost can be thought of as the externality
imposed on the society.
Looking at Figures 3 and 4, this effect seems most pronounced for initial correlation around
c ≈ −0.5, where the one-agent intervention results in increased polarization compared to the initial
state c(1) < c, the polarization cost is large and the range of thresholds T for which the influencer
profits from the one-agent strategy is relatively large. This suggests that a situation where the
society is already somewhat polarized is particularly vulnerable to spiraling out of control. It also
suggests that situations where the level of commitment required for the decision (i.e., the threshold
T ) is large increase the risk of polarization.
We also note that this overall picture is complicated by the case of positive initial correlation
c > 0. In that case both two- and one-agent interventions actually increase the correlation between
the agents, even though the two-agent intervention does so to a larger extent. The analysis leading
to the proof of Proposition 5.2 is contained in Appendix B.
5.2 One intervention, many agents: finding the densest spherical cap
A more general version of the problem of persuading with limited number of interventions features
n agents with opinions u1, . . . , un ∈ Rd. The influencer is given a threshold 0 ≤ T < 1 and can
apply one intervention v with the objective of maximizing the number of agents such that u′i,d > T .
As before, we assume that intially ui,d = 0 and that T can be interpreted as a threshold above
which a consumer decides to buy the newly advertised product, or more generally take a desired
action, such as voting, donating, etc.
Interestingly, we show that this problem is equivalent to a generalization of the densest hemi-
sphere problem from the long-term scenario discussed in Section 4. More precisely, it is equivalent
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Figure 3: Illustration of the polarization cost
as a function of the initial correlation c. The
dashed line is the initial correlation included
as a reference point. The red and blue lines
are correlations after applying two- and one-
agent interventions respectively. The green
line shows the polarization cost c(2) − c(1).
Figure 4: The red line represents the opin-
ion of both agents u′i,3 (as a function of c) af-
ter applying the two-agent intervention. The
blue line is the opinion of the second agent af-
ter the one-agent intervention. For reference,
the dashed line (1/3) shows the opinion of
the first agent in the one-agent intervention
(which turns out not to depend on c). The
grey area represents the range of thresholds
T where it is optimal to apply the one-agent
intervention.
to finding a densest spherical cap of a given radius (that depends on the threshold T ) in d − 1
dimensions.
We give the technical statement in the proposition below. We make an assumption 0 ≤ T < 1/3,
since 1/3 is the maximum value that can be achieved in the d-th coordinate by a single intervention,
cf. Figure 4. In order to state Proposition 5.3, we slightly abuse notation and write vectors u ∈ Rd
as u = (u∗, ud) for u∗ ∈ Rd−1, ud ∈ R.
Proposition 5.3. In the setting above, let
c :=
2T
1− 3T 2 , z :=
√√
1 + 3c2 − 1√
3c
, β := arccos(z) .
Then, the number of agents with u′i,d > T is maximized by applying an intervention
v := (cosβ · v∗, sinβ) (18)
for v∗ ∈ Rd−1 that maximizes the number of agents satisfying
〈u∗i , v∗〉 > c .
The proof of Proposition 5.3 is contained in Appendix C. Note that the solution to this short-
term problem for T going to zero approaches the densest hemisphere solution to the long-term
problem discussed in Section 4.
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6 Asymptotic effects of two dueling influencers: two randomized
interventions polarize
Finally, we analyze a scenario where there are two influencers with differing agendas, represented
by different1 intervention vectors v and v′. We consider the randomized setup, where at each time
step, one of the influencers is randomly chosen to apply their intervention. We demonstrate that
this setting also results, in most cases and in a certain sense, in the polarization of agents.
Recall that a convex cone of two vectors v and v′ is the set {αv + βv′ : α, β ≥ 0}. A precise
statement that we prove is:
Theorem 6.1. Let 〈v, v′〉 > 0 and let a starting opinion u(1) be such that 〈u(1), v〉 6= 0 or 〈u(1), v′〉 6=
0. Then, as t goes to infinity and almost surely, either the Euclidean distance between u(t) and the
convex cone generated by v and v′ or between u(t) and the convex cone generated by −v and −v′
goes to 0.
In order to justify the assumptions of Theorem 6.1, note that if an agent starts with an opinion
u such that
〈u, v〉 = 〈u, v′〉 = 0 , (19)
applying v or v′ never changes their opinion. In Theorem 6.1 we show that if (19) does not hold
and, additionally, 〈v, v′〉 > 0, (if 〈v, v′〉 < 0 we can exchange v′ with −v′ without changing the
effects of any interventions), the opinion vector with probability 1 ends up either converging to the
convex cone generated by v and v′ or the convex cone generated by −v and −v′. In particular, since
vectors u for which (19) holds form a set of measure 0, if n initial opinions are sampled i.i.d. from an
absolutely continuous distribution, almost surely all opinions converge to the convex cones (which
are themselves sets of measure 0).
Furthermore, we attempt to strengthen this notion of polarization. As in Theorem 3.1, the best
we can hope for is that for each pair of opinions either the distance between u(t)1 and u
(t)
2 or between
u
(t)
1 and −u(t)2 converges to 0. Letting V := span{v, v′} and W := V ⊥ and writing any vector u as
a sum of its respective projections u = uV + uW , we show:
Theorem 6.2. Suppose that 〈v, v′〉 > 1/√2 + η and let u(1)1 , u(1)2 be such that (u(1)1 )V 6= 0, (u(1)2 )V 6=
0. Then, almost surely, either ‖u(t)1 − u(t)2 ‖ converges to 0, or ‖u(t)1 + u(t)2 ‖ converges to 0.
In other words, we prove a stronger notion of convergence in case the correlation between
interventions v and v′ is larger than
〈v, v′〉 > 1√
2 + η
>
√
2
2
≈ 0.71 .
In particular, for η = 1 our result applies if 〈v, v′〉 > √3/3 ≈ 0.58. Our experiments suggest that
this convergence occurs also for other values of 〈v, v′〉, but we do not prove it here.
We also note that the usual argument from symmetry shows that if the initial opinions are
independent samples from a symmetric distribution, then with high probability the opinions divide
into two clusters of roughly equal size.
The remaining case when v and v′ are orthogonal is different. As we mentioned, if 〈v, v′〉 > 0,
i.e., the angle between v and v′ is less than pi/2 (cf. also Figure 8), then all opinions converge to
1We also assume that v 6= −v′, as otherwise the intervention effects are the same in our model.
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the two “narrow” convex cones, respectively between v and v′ and between −v and −v′ - namely,
the pairs of vectors among v, v′,−v, and −v′ between which there are acute angles. Similarly, if
〈v, v′〉 < 0, then the opinions converge to two cones between v and −v′ and between −v and v′. In
case 〈v, v′〉 = 0 the four convex cones form right angles, so such a result is not possible.
However, we can still show that an initial opinion u(1) converges to the same quadrant in which
it starts with respect to v and v′. Namely, for all t, we have that sgn
(〈
u(t), v
〉)
= sgn
(〈
u(1), v
〉)
and sgn
(〈
u(t), v′
〉)
= sgn
(〈
u(1), v′
〉)
, and furthermore the distance between u(t) and the subspace
V goes to 0 with t:
Corollary 6.3. Let 〈v, v′〉 = 0 and let an initial opinion u = u(1) be such that 〈u, v〉 6= 0 and
〈u, v′〉 6= 0. Then, almost surely, the following facts hold:
1. ‖u(t)W ‖ → 0 as t→∞.
2. For all t, sgn
(〈
u(t), v
〉)
= sgn
(〈
u(1), v
〉)
and sgn
(〈
u(t), v′
〉)
= sgn
(〈
u(1), v′
〉)
.
In order to prove Theorem 6.1, we first show that the distance between u(t) and V almost surely
goes to 0 as t → ∞, by showing that the norm of the projection of u(t) onto W converges to 0.
Then, we demonstrate that the convex cone spanned by v and v′ is absorbing: when the projection
of u(T ) onto V falls in the cone, then the projections of u(t) for t ≥ T always stay in the cone as
well.
Finally, we show that almost surely the projection of u(t) onto V eventually enters either the
cone spanned by v and v′, or the cone spanned by −v and −v′. More concretely, we show that at
any time t, there is a sequence of T interventions that lands the projection of u(t+T ) in one of the
cones, for some T that is independent of t. Since this sequence occurs with probability 2−T , which
is independent of t, the opinion almost surely eventually enters one of the cones.
6.1 Proofs of Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.3
We start with the fact the opinions converge to the subspace V spanned by the two intervention
vectors. Recall that V = span{v, v′} and that W = V ⊥. In the following we will write 〈v, v′〉 = cos θ
for 0 < θ ≤ pi/2.
Proposition 6.4. Let 〈v, v′〉 ≥ 0 and take an opinion vector u such that ‖uV ‖ = c ≥ 0. Further-
more, let u′ be the vector resulting from randomly intervening on u with either v or v′. Then:
1. ‖u′W ‖2 ≤ ‖uW ‖2.
2. With probability at least 1/2, ‖u′W ‖2 ≤ ‖uW ‖2 · (1− ξ), where
ξ = min
(
1
2
, (η2/2 + η) · c
2θ2
16
)
.
Proof. Recall from (2)–(3) that if v∗ ∈ {v, v′} is the intervention vector, then
u′ = α(u+ η 〈u, v∗〉 · v∗)
where α =
√
1
1+(2η+η2)·〈u,v∗〉2 is the normalizing constant. Observe that when we project onto W ,
the component in the direction of v∗ vanishes, so we have that
u′W = α · uW ,
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and the first claim easily follows since α ≤ 1.
To establish the second point, we need to show that with probability 1/2 we have α2 < 1 or,
equivalently, 〈u, v∗〉2 = 〈uV , v∗〉2 > 0. Since θ 6= 0, the projected vector uV cannot be orthogonal
both to v and v′ (cf. Figure 5). More precisely, for at least one of v∗ ∈ {v, v′} the primary angle
between uV and v∗ (or −v∗) must be at most pi/2− θ/2 and consequently
|〈uV , v∗〉| ≥ ‖uV ‖ · | cos(pi/2− θ/2)| ≥ c · θ/4 ,
resulting in
α2 =
1
1 + (2η + η2) · 〈uV , v∗〉2 ≤ max
(
1
2
, 1− (η + η2/2) · c
2θ2
16
)
.
v
v′
uV u
′
V
θ
Figure 5: Projection onto the subspace V = span{v, v′}.
Next, we show that the convex cone of vectors v and v′ is absorbing:
Proposition 6.5. Let 〈v, v′〉 ≥ 0 and take u to be an opinion vector and u′ to be a vector resulting
from intervening on u with either v or v′. If uV is a conical combination of v and v′, then also u′V
is such a conical combination.
Proof. Assume wlog that the vector applied is v. Then,
u′/α = u+ η · 〈u, v〉 · v = uV + η · 〈uV , v〉 · v + uW .
Therefore, u′V can be written as a nonnegative linear combination of uV and v, where we use the
fact that 〈uV , v〉 is nonnegative, which follows since uV is a conical combination of v and v′, and
〈v, v′〉 ≥ 0.
Next, we prove that when 〈v, v′〉 > 0, the opinion ut not only approaches subspace V , but also
a specific area of V , namely, either cone(v, v′) or cone(−v,−v′).
Proposition 6.6. Let 〈v, v′〉 > 0 and consider a vector u = u(t) such that ‖uV ‖ ≥ c > 0. Then,
there exists T := T (c, θ, η) such that for u′ := u(t+T ), with probability at least 2−T , vector u′V will
either be a conical combination of v and v′ or a conical combination of −v and −v′.
Proof. First, for any vector u such that ‖uV ‖ ≥ c > 0, at least one of v, v′,−v,−v′ has positive
inner product with u (and uV ) which can be lower bounded by a function of c and θ (see Figure 5).
Take such a vector and call it v∗. Applying it repeatedly will make u′V arbitrarily close to v
∗
(cf. Proposition 6.4).
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Finally, after choosing the number of applications of v∗ such that both ‖u′−u′V ‖ and ‖u′V −v∗‖
are small enough, we apply the other intervention vector (v or v′) once. Since 〈v, v′〉 > 0, it
should be clear that at this stage vector u′V either already is in the convex cone (and the additional
intervention keeps it inside) or the intervention with the other vector brings it inside the cone.
Therefore, there exists a sequence of T (c, θ, η) interventions that make uV enter cone(v, v′) or
the cone(−v,−v′).
We combine Propositions 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 to show that when 〈v, v′〉 6= 0, almost any vector u
eventually approaches one of the convex cones (cone(v, v′) or cone(−v,−v′)) as time goes to infinity.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let ‖uV ‖ = c > 0. Proposition 6.4 tells us that the squared norm of the
component uW in the subspace W = V ⊥ never increases, and with probability 1/2 decreases by
the multiplicative factor 1− ξ(c, η, θ) > 0. By induction (note that ξ only increases together with
c in successive applications), uW converges to 0, and consequently ‖u−uV ‖ converges to 0, almost
surely.
In order to show that convergence to one of the two convex cones occurs, we apply Proposi-
tion 6.6. Since at any time step t, there exists a sequence of T choices that puts uV in one of the
convex cones, and since T depends only on the starting parameters c, θ, and η, we get that uV
almost surely eventually enters one of the cones. By Proposition 6.5 and induction, once uV enters
a convex cone, it never leaves.
As a corollary (Corollary 6.3) of Propositions 6.4 and 6.5, when 〈v, v′〉 = 0, uV always stays in
the quadrant it starts in.
Proof of Corollary 6.3. The first statement is an inductive application of Proposition 6.4, exactly
the same as in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
The second statement follows from noting that out of four orthogonal pairs of vectors {v, v′},
{v,−v′}, {−v, v′}, or {−v,−v′}, there is exactly one such that uV is a (strict) conical combination
of this pair (by assuming 〈u, v〉 6= 0 and 〈u, v′〉 6= 0 we avoid ambiguity in case uV is parallel to v
or v′). By the same argument as in Proposition 6.5 and by induction, if the initial projection uV
is strictly inside one of the convex cones, it remains strictly inside forever.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 6.2
Consider the subspace V = span{v, v′} with some coordinate system (cf. Figure 5) imposed on it.
As is standard, a unit vector u ∈ V can be represented in this system by its angle α(u) ∈ [0, 2pi) as
measured clockwise from the positive x-axis.
Given a unit vector v∗ ∈ V , let fv∗ : [0, 2pi) → [0, 2pi) be the function with the following
meaning: given a unit vector u ∈ V with angle α = α(u), the value fv∗(α) = α(u′) represents the
angle of vector u′ resulting from applying intervention v∗ to vector u. Note that α(v∗) is a fixed
point of fv∗ . Also, by Proposition 6.5, both functions fv and fv′ map the cone(v, v′) to itself.
The main part of our argument is the following lemma, which we prove last:
Lemma 6.7. Functions fv and fv′ restricted to the convex cone of v and v′ are contractions, i.e.,
there exists k = k(θ, η) < 1 such that for all vectors u, u′ ∈ cone(v, v′), letting α := α(u), β :=
α(u′), v∗ ∈ {v, v′}, we have
|fv∗(β)− fv∗(α)| ≤ k · |β − α| , (20)
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where the distances |fv∗(β) − fv∗(α)| and |β − α| are in the metric induced by S1, i.e., “modulo
2pi”.
Lemma 6.7 implies that the angle distance between two opinions u(t)1 , u
(t)
2 ∈ V starting in the
convex cone deterministically converges to 0 as t goes to infinity. Of course, this is equivalent to
their Euclidean distance ‖u(t)1 − u(t)2 ‖ converging to 0. We now make a continuity argument to
show that such convergence almost surely occurs also for general u(t)1 , u
(t)
2 ∈ Rd. To this end, we
let gv, gv′ : Sd−1 → [0, 2pi) as natural extensions of fv, fv′ : the value gv∗(u) denotes the angle of the
projection u′V of the new opinion onto V , after applying v
∗ on opinion u (cf. Figure 5). Note that
the value gv∗(u) depends only on the angle α(uV ) and the orthogonal projection length ‖uW ‖:
gv∗(u) = gv∗
(
α(uV ), ‖uW ‖
)
.
In this parametrization, for u ∈ V we have fv∗(α(u)) = gv∗(u) = gv∗(α(u), 0).
By Theorem 6.1, for any starting opinions u(1)1 and u
(1)
2 having non-zero projections onto V ,
almost surely there exists a t such that (u(t)1 )V and (u
(t)
2 )V end up inside (possibly different) convex
cones. We consider the case of u(t)1 and u
(t)
2 both in cone(v, v
′), other three cases being analogous.
Furthermore, almost surely, ‖(u(t)1 )W ‖ and ‖(u(t)2 )W ‖ converge to 0. Hence, it is enough that we
show that almost surely |α((u(t)1 )V )− α((u(t)2 )V )| (in S1 distance) converges to zero.
To this end, let δ > 0. By uniform continuity of gv, we know that for small enough value of
r = ‖uW ‖, we have
|gv(α, r)− gv(α, 0)| < 1− k
4
· δ
for every α ∈ [0, 2pi), where k is the Lipschitz constant from (20). Therefore, almost surely, for t
large enough, for u(t)1 and u
(t)
2 parameterized as u
(t)
1 = (α1, r1) and u
(t)
2 = (α2, r2) we have
|fv(α1, r1)− fv(α2, r2)| ≤ |fv(α1, r1)− fv(α1, 0)|+ |fv(α1, 0)− fv(α2, 0)|+ |fv(α2, 0)− fv(α2, r2)|
≤ 1− k
4
· δ + k · |α1 − α2|+ 1− k
4
· δ ≤
(
k +
1− k
2
)
·max(|α1 − α2|, δ) .
Since k+(1− k)/2 < 1, and applying the same argument to fv′ , we conclude by induction that the
distance |α1(t)−α2(t)| must decrease and stay below δ in a finite number of steps. Since δ > 0 was
arbitrary, it must be that |α1(t)− α2(t)| converges to 0, concluding the proof of Theorem 6.2.
It remains to prove Lemma 6.7:
Proof of Lemma 6.7. Let f := f(1,0), i.e., f corresponds to the intervention along the x-axis.
Clearly, functions fv and fv′ are cyclic shifts of f . More precisely, we have
fv∗(α) = α(v∗) + f
(
α− α(v∗)) , (21)
where arithmetic in (21) is modulo 2pi. Furthermore, f is symmetric around the intervention vector,
i.e., f(α) = 2pi − f(2pi − α) for 0 ≤ α ≤ pi. Hence, to prove that fv and fv′ restricted to cone(v, v′)
are contractions, it is enough that we show that f restricted to the interval [0, θ] is a contraction
(recall that we assumed cos2(θ) > 1/(2 + η)).
To that end, we use (2) to calculate the formula for f for 0 ≤ α ≤ pi/2 as
f(α) = arccos
(
(1 + η) cosα√
1 + (η2 + 2η) cos2 α
)
. (22)
More computation establishes that, additionally, for every 0 ≤ α < β ≤ pi/2:
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Figure 6: The graph of the “pull function” α− f(α) in case η = 1.
1. f(α) ≤ α. In other words, applying the intervention brings vector u closer to the intervention
vector.
2. f(α) < f(β), i.e., applying the intervention does not change relative ordering of vectors wrt
the intervention vector.
3. If β ≤ θ∗ := arccos
(√
1
2+η
)
, then α− f(α) < β − f(β), i.e., in absolute terms, the “pull” on
a vector is stronger the further away it is from the intervention vector (until the correlation
reaches the threshold 1/
√
2 + η, cf. Figure 6).
The preceding items taken together imply that for every 0 ≤ α < β ≤ θ∗ we have 0 < f(β)−f(α) <
β − α. To conclude that f is a contraction, we observe that for any θ < θ∗ we have that f
and f ′ are continuous on the interval [0, θ]. If there exist sequences (αk) and (βk) such that
|f(αk) − f(βk)|/|βk − αk| converges to 1, then, by compactness, there exist convergent sequences
αk → α∗ and βk → β∗ such that |f(αk)− f(βk)|/|βk − αk| → 1. Then,
1. Either α∗ 6= β∗ and by continuity we get f(β∗)− f(α∗) = β∗−α∗, contradicting the property
we stated above.
2. Or α∗ = β∗, which by continuity of f ′ implies f ′(α∗) = 1 for some 0 ≤ α∗ ≤ θ. But this can
also seen to be false by verifying that
d
dα
(
α− f(α)) = 1− f ′(α) > 0
for 0 ≤ α ≤ θ. This can be checked directly from (22) (see also Figure 6).
27
References
[AK98] Edoardo Amaldi and Viggo Kann. On the approximability of minimizing nonzero
variables or unsatisfied relations in linear systems. Theoretical Computer Science,
209(1–2):237–260, 1998.
[Axe97] Robert Axelrod. The dissemination of culture: A model with local convergence and
global polarization. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(2):203–226, 1997.
[BAB+18] Christopher A. Bail, Lisa P. Argyle, Taylor W. Brown, John P. Bumpus, Haohan
Chen, M. B. Fallin Hunzaker, Jaemin Lee, Marcus Mann, Friedolin Merhout, and
Alexander Volfovsky. Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political
polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(37):9216–9221,
2018.
[Bal07] Delia Baldassarri. Crosscutting Social Spheres? Political Polarization and the Social
Roots of Pluralism. PhD thesis, Columbia University, 2007.
[BB06] Nader H. Bshouty and Lynn Burroughs. Maximizing agreements and coagnostic learn-
ing. Theoretical Computer Science, 350(1):24–39, 2006.
[BB07] Delia Baldassarri and Peter Bearman. Dynamics of political polarization. American
Sociological Review, 72(5):784–811, 2007.
[BBC20] BBC. Trump signs executive order targeting Twitter after fact-checking row, 2020. 29
May 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52843986.
[BDEL03] Shai Ben-David, Nadav Eiron, and Philip M. Long. On the difficulty of approximately
maximizing agreements. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 66(3):496–514,
2003.
[BDES02] Shai Ben-David, Nadav Eiron, and Hans Ulrich Simon. The computational complexity
of densest region detection. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 64(1):22–47,
2002.
[BDS00] Shai Ben-David and Hans-Ulrich Simon. Efficient learning of linear perceptrons. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), pages 189–195, 2000.
[BG98] Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal. Learning from neighbours. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 65(3):595–621, 1998.
[BG08] Delia Baldassarri and Andrew Gelman. Partisans without constraint: Political po-
larization and trends in American public opinion. American Journal of Sociology,
114(2):408–446, 2008.
[BMA15] Eytan Bakshy, Solomon Messing, and Lada A. Adamic. Exposure to ideologically
diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Science, 348(6239):1130–1132, 2015.
[CRF+11] Michael D. Conover, Jacob Ratkiewicz, Matthew Francisco, Bruno Gonc¸alves, Filippo
Menczer, and Alessandro Flammini. Political polarization on Twitter. In International
Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM), pages 89–96, 2011.
28
[DGL13] Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, and David T. Lee. Biased assimilation, homophily,
and the dynamics of polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
110(15):5791–5796, 2013.
[DVSC+17] Michela Del Vicario, Antonio Scala, Guido Caldarelli, H. Eugene Stanley, and Wal-
ter Quattrociocchi. Modeling confirmation bias and polarization. Scientific Reports,
7:40391, 2017.
[FA08] Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams. Political polarization in the American public.
Annual Reviev of Political Science, 11:563–588, 2008.
[FAP05] Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. Culture War? The Myth
of a Polarized America. Pearson-Longman, 2005.
[FGKP06] Vitaly Feldman, Parikshit Gopalan, Subhash Khot, and Ashok Kumar Ponnuswami.
New results for learning noisy parities and halfspaces. In Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 563–574, 2006.
[For18] Jacey Fortin. A list of the companies cutting ties with the N.R.A., 2018. The
New York Times website, 24 February 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/
24/business/nra-companies-boycott.html.
[Gar18] Kiran Garimella. Polarization on Social Media. PhD thesis, Aalto University, 2018.
20/2018.
[GGPT17] Kiran Garimella, Aristides Gionis, Nikos Parotsidis, and Nikolaj Tatti. Balancing
information exposure in social networks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems (NIPS), pages 4663–4671, 2017.
[GMGM17] Kiran Garimella, Gianmarco De Francisci Morales, Aristides Gionis, and Michael
Mathioudakis. Reducing controversy by connecting opposing views. In International
Conference on Web Search and Data Mining (WSDM), pages 81–90. ACM, 2017.
[GR09] Venkatesan Guruswami and Prasad Raghavendra. Hardness of learning halfspaces with
noise. SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(2):742–765, 2009.
[HK02] Rainer Hegselmann and Ulrich Krause. Opinion dynamics and bounded confidence.
models, analysis, and simulation. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation,
5(3), 2002.
[IW15] Shanto Iyengar and Sean J. Westwood. Fear and loathing across party lines: New
evidence on group polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3):690–707,
2015.
[JMB04] Ali Jadbabaie, Nader Motee, and Mauricio Barahona. On the stability of the Kuramoto
model of coupled nonlinear oscillators. In American Control Conference (ACC), vol-
ume 5, pages 4296–4301, 2004.
[KP18] Stefan Krasa and Mattias K. Polborn. Political competition in legislative elections.
American Political Science Review, 112(4):809–825, 2018.
[KW18] Ilyana Kuziemko and Ebonya Washington. Why did the democrats lose the south?
Bringing new data to an old debate. American Economic Review, 108(10):2830–67,
2018.
29
[LBS00] Howard Lavine, Eugene Borgida, and John L. Sullivan. On the relationship between
attitude involvement and attitude accessibility: Toward a cognitive-motivational model
of political information processing. Political Psychology, 21(1):81–106, 2000.
[LRL79] Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper. Biased assimilation and attitude
polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11):2098–2109, 1979.
[MKFB03] Michael W. Macy, James A. Kitts, Andreas Flache, and Steve Benard. Polarization in
dynamic networks: A Hopfield model of emergent structure. Dynamic Social Network
Modeling and Analysis, pages 162–173, 2003.
[MS05] Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer. The market for news. American Economic
Review, 95(4):1031–1053, 2005.
[MS10] Elchanan Mossel and Grant Schoenebeck. Reaching consensus on social networks. In
Innovations in Computer Science (ITCS), 2010.
[Noa98] Mark Noah. Beyond individual differences: Social differentiation from first principles.
American Sociological Review, 63(3):309, 1998.
[NSL90] Andrzej Nowak, Jacek Szamrej, and Bibb Latane´. From private attitude to public
opinion: A dynamic theory of social impact. Psychological Review, 97(3):362, 1990.
[Par11] Eli Pariser. The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We
Read and How We Think. Penguin, New York, 2011.
[Pew14] Pew Research Center. Political polarization in the American public: How in-
creasing ideological uniformity and partisan antipathy affect politics, compro-
mise and everyday life, 2014. https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/
political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.
[PPTF17] Sergey E. Parsegov, Anton V. Proskurnikov, Roberto Tempo, and Noah E. Friedkin.
Novel multidimensional models of opinion dynamics in social networks. IEEE Trans-
actions on Automatic Control, 62(5):2270–2285, May 2017.
[Pri13] Markus Prior. Media and political polarization. Annual Review of Political Science,
16:101–127, 2013.
[PT06] Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp. A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact
theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(5):751–783, 2006.
[PY18] Jacopo Perego and Sevgi Yuksel. Media competition and social disagreement, 2018.
Working Paper.
[SCP+19] Kazutoshi Sasahara, Wen Chen, Hao Peng, Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Alessan-
dro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. On the inevitability of online echo chambers.
arXiv:1905.03919, 2019.
[SH15] John Sides and Daniel J. Hopkins. Political polarization in American politics. Blooms-
bury Publishing USA, 2015.
[Sny15] Brendan Snyder. LGBT advertising: How brands are taking a stance on issues. Think
with Google, 2015.
30
[SPJ+16] Guodong Shi, Alexandre Proutiere, Mikael Johansson, John S. Baras, and Karl H.
Johansson. The evolution of beliefs over signed social networks. Operations Research,
64(3):585–604, 2016.
[SVS04] Elizabeth A. Saylor, Katherine A. Vittes, and Susan B. Sorenson. Firearm advertising:
Product depiction in consumer gun magazines. Evaluation Review, 28(5):420–433,
2004.
[VSL77] Donald E. Vinson, Jerome E. Scott, and Lawrence M. Lamont. The role of personal
values in marketing and consumer behavior. Journal of Marketing, 41(2):44–50, 1977.
[WMKL15] Hywel T.P. Williams, James R. McMurray, Tim Kurz, and F. Hugo Lambert. Network
analysis reveals open forums and echo chambers in social media discussions of climate
change. Global Environmental Change, 32:126–138, 2015.
[Zal92] John R. Zaller. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press,
1992.
31
A Example with two advertisers
For another slightly more involved example, suppose there are two advertisers marketing their
products. Agents’ opinions now have five dimensions (d = 5) with the fourth and fifth coordinates
corresponding to the opinions on these two products. Initially, 500 opinions on the first three
coordinates are distributed randomly and uniformly on a three-dimensional sphere, and the last
two coordinates are equal to zero:
ui = (ui,1, ui,2, ui,3, 0, 0) subject to u2i,1 + u
2
i,2 + u
2
i,3 = 1 .
Suppose the two advertisers apply interventions v1 and v2 in an alternating fashion. We take v1
and v2 to be orthogonal, letting
v1 = (β, 0, 0, α, 0) , v2 = (0, β, 0, 0, α) , α =
3
4
, β =
√
1− α2 .
We proceed to apply v1 and v2 in an alternating fashion. In Figure 7 we illustrate the agents’
opinions after each advertiser applied their intervention two, four and six times (so the total of,
respectively, four, eight and twelve interventions have been applied). A pattern of polarization on
the fourth and fifth coordinates can be observed. At the same time, the pattern on the first three
coordinates is more complicated. The opinions on these dimensions are scattered around a circle
on the plane spanned by the first two coordinates. This is a somewhat special behavior that arises
because vectors v1 and v2 are orthogonal. It is connected to the difference between Theorem 6.1
and Corollary 6.3 discussed in Section 6.
B Proof of Proposition 5.2
Recall that the two-agent intervention maximizes min(u′1,d, u
′
2,d). Due to symmetry, we will consider
wlog the one-agent intervention that maximizes u′1,d. Substituting into (1), we get that applying
an intervention v results in
u′i,d =
〈ui, v〉 · vd√
1 + 3〈ui, v〉2
. (23)
Recalling (4), we can apply any unitary transformation on the first d − 1 coordinates without
changing the problem, and hence assume that
u1 := (sinα, cosα, 0, . . . , 0) , u2 := (− sinα, cosα, 0, . . . , 0) (24)
for some 0 ≤ α ≤ pi/2 and accordingly, c = cos2 α − sin2 α = cos(2α). In particular, α = 0 means
that the agents are in full agreement, α = pi/4 corresponds to the case of orthogonal opinions and
α = pi/2 is the case where the opinions are antipodal.
Furthermore, due to (23), once we fix 〈u1, v〉 and 〈u2, v〉, which is now equivalent to fixing v1
and v2, the values of u′i,d depend only on vd in a linear fashion. Therefore, we can conclude that
both two- and one-agent interventions have vk = 0 for 2 < k < d. Hence, in the following we will
assume wlog that d = 3, u1 = (sinα, cosα, 0) and u2 = (− sinα, cosα, 0) (see Figure 8).
First, consider the one-agent intervention maximizing u′1,3. Clearly, the intervention should be
of the form
v(1) = cosβ · u1 + sinβ · (0, 0, 1)
32
t = 2
t = 4
t = 6
Figure 7: Illustration of the process described in Section A. This time we need to visualize five
dimensions. This is done with spatial positions for the first three dimensions j = 1, 2, 3 and two
different color scales for j = 4, 5. Accordingly, two figures are displayed for each time step t = 2, 4, 6.
In each pair of figures the points in the left figure have the same spatial positions as in the right
figure and the colors visualize j = 4 (on the left) and j = 5 (on the right).
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u1u2
v⊥ =
√
3/3 · u1
αα
u1u2 v⊥
αα
Figure 8: The projection of one-agent (left) and two-agent (right) interventions onto the first two
dimensions.
for some 0 ≤ β ≤ pi/2. Substituting in (24), we compute
(u′1,3)
2 =
cos2 β sin2 β
1 + 3 cos2 β
. (25)
Maximizing (25), we get cosβ0 =
√
3/3 and
v(1) =
√
3
3
· u1 +
√
6
3
· (0, 0, 1) ,
resulting in u′1,3 = 1/3. The value 1/3 is the benchmark for what can be achieved by a single
intervention. It is a maximum value for u′1,3 attainable provided that initially u1,3 = 0.
What is the effect of this intervention on the other opinion u2? Again substituting into (24),
we get
u′2,3 =
√
3c/3 · √6/3√
1 + c2
=
c
√
2
3
√
1 + c2
.
The value of u′2,3 as a function of the correlation c ∈ [−1, 1] is shown in blue in Figure 4. In
particular, it increases from −1/3 to 1/3, passing through 0 for c = 0.
Moving to the two-agent case, in this case it is not difficult to see (cf. Figure 8) that the
intervention vector should be of the form
v = (0, cosβ, sinβ)
for some 0 ≤ β ≤ pi/2. A computation in a computer algebra system (CAS) establishes that
u′1,3 = u′2,3 is maximized for
cos2 β =
√
2(
√
3c+ 5−√2)
3(c+ 1)
,
yielding an expression
u′1,3 = u
′
2,3 =
√
3c+ 7− 2√6c+ 10
9(c+ 1)
.
This function is depicted in Figure 4 in red. In particular, for c ∈ [−1, 1], it increases from 0 to
1/3 and its value at 0 is approximately 0.27. Furthermore, its growth close to c = −1 is of the
square-root type.
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Turning to the new correlation values c(1) and c(2), another CAS computation gives
c(1) =
c
√
2√
c2 + 1
, c(2) = 1−
√
2(1− c)√
3c+ 5
,
establishing (17). To conclude the proof we need another elementary calculation showing that
c(2) ≥ c(1) always holds. We skip that, referring to Figure 3 and noting that in the critical region
for c = 1− ε we have
c(2) = 1− 1
2
ε− 3
32
ε2 +O(ε3) ≥ c(1) = 1− 1
2
ε− 3
8
ε2 +O(ε3) .
C Proof of Proposition 5.3
Let us write a generic intervention vector as
v = (cosβ · v∗, sinβ) ,
where 0 ≤ β ≤ pi/2, v∗ ∈ Rd−1 and ‖v∗‖ = 1. If v is applied to an opinion vector ui = (u∗i , 0) and
we let ci := 〈u∗i , v∗〉, substituting into (2) we can compute
ui + 〈ui, v〉 · v = (u∗i , 0) + ci cosβ(cosβ · v∗, sinβ) = (u∗i + ci cos2 β · v∗, ci cosβ sinβ) ,
and therefore, using (3),
u′i,d =
ci cosβ sinβ√
1 + 3c2i cos
2 β
=
ciz
√
1− z2√
1 + 3c2i z
2
, (26)
where we let z := cosβ.
Consider a fixed direction v∗ ∈ Rd−1. In order to maximize u′i,d for an opinion ui with 〈u∗i , v∗〉 =
ci, we need to optimize over z in (26), resulting in z =
√√
1 + 3c2i − 1/(
√
3ci) and, substituting,
u′i,d =
√
1 + 3c2i − 1
3ci
. (27)
The right-hand side of (26) is easily seen to be increasing in ci > 0 for a fixed z. Therefore, in order
to maximize the number of points with u′i,d > T for a fixed v
∗, we solve the equation T =
√
1+3c2−1
3c
for c, resulting in c = 2T
1−3T 2 and apply the intervention
v = (cosβ · v∗, sinβ) ,
just as claimed in (18). This intervention results in the desired effect for all opinions satisfying
u′i,d > T ⇐⇒ 〈u∗i , v∗〉 > c ,
which means that the points u∗i on which the objective u
′
i,d > T is achieved are exactly those
contained in the spherical cap {x ∈ Rd−1 : 〈x, v∗〉 > c}. Maximizing over all directions v∗ ∈ Rd−1
completes the proof.
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